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1. INTRODUCTION
Formal systems offer a precise way to characterize people’s vari-
ous reasoning goals. There aremany logics for different situations.
Some allow reasoners to withdraw conclusions as more infor-
mation is learned. Others describe the logic of deontic rules
about “ought” and “must.” There are logics for relevance and for
probabilities. Each logic provides different norms, e.g., for what
constitutes a valid logical argument or whether a sentence is true.
Elqayam and Evans (2011) propose that normativity in psycho-
logical practice should be avoided. We cannot see how. In this
article we argue that without norms of some kind, we cannot
interpret the data participants produce. Rather, participants’ rea-
soning goals generate their own norms of reasoning and logics
provide a good way to capture these norms. Pure descriptivism is
impossible, and highly undesirable.
We first remind the reader of the distinction between consti-
tutive and regulative norms which plays an important role in this
paper. Constitutive norms define a certain behavior for what it is
(see Searle, 1969). Characteristic examples are the rules of a game,
e.g., the game of chess: changing the rules means playing a dif-
ferent game. Norms are regulative rather than constitutive when
they do not define but regulate a preexisting activity. In this sense,
regulative norms are not necessary and they are also derivative:
they are consequences of constitutive norms, together with con-
textual features such as overall goals or specific constraints. For
instance, what move to perform at any point when playing a game
of chess is dictated by regulative norms: it may be that one wants
to lose and terminate the game as soon as possible. Even with this
unusual contextual goal, the revised regulative norms arise from
the usual constitutive norms. Importantly, regulative norms are
action oriented, in the sense that they tell one what to do.
Formal systems are instrumental in specifying constitutive
and regulative norms, which is in turn necessary in order to
understand what participants do in a particular reasoning task.
Formal systems are characterized by constitutive norms: doing
arithmetic is constituted by complying with the well known con-
stitutive norms of arithmetic. And constitutive norms give rise to
regulative norms (Achourioti et al., 2011). If you are dealing with
numbers that represent prices of items, and you want a total, then
adding them is permissible—a regulative norm. If you are deal-
ing with numbers which are barcode identifiers and you want to
count tokens (stocktaking perhaps?), then adding two of them is
nonsense—another regulative norm. Formal systems impose reg-
ulative norms on non-formal activities that use them, and they
do it as a consequence of their constitutive norms. Not uniquely
of course, as our examples of trying to lose at chess, and differ-
ent activities with numbers show. What the regulative norm is
depends on the goals and other contextual features at hand; and
as goals may be radically different (think of our earlier exam-
ple of someone playing chess to lose), the regulative norms they
generate may be radically different too.
Norms and values are, in the crucial cases for the psychology of
reasoning, the least observable features of thinking—the farthest
from being fixed by data without system or theory. Participants
generally cannot describe their goals in the terms of appropriate
systems or theory. Their performances nevertheless can provide
evidence for theory-relative normative specification of goals, once
a formal analysis is available. In this paper we illustrate these
points with experimental examples.
There certainly are abuses of norms to be observed. We pro-
pose that these are most evident when any single homogeneous
system account of human reasoning is proposed, whether it be
classical logic (CL), probability theory, or indeed radical descrip-
tivism with a single description language. As soon as hegemony
is proposed, it becomes impossible to study the basis for selec-
tion from among multiple systems of reasoning, and it is this
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requirement to select from multiple possible systems that most
clearly dissolves perceived problems of normativity, and connects
reasoning goals to instrumental goals. Selecting from multiple
possible reasoning goals can be done on instrumental grounds
suiting the goals to the problem at hand. We do not believe there
is any such thing as “human reasoning” construed as a homoge-
nous system for the simple reason that the demands of different
reasoning problems are incompatible, as we illustrate below. The
main reasoning goal of this paper it to illustrate this point with
examples from past and current practice.
The backdrop to our approach to norms and normativity is
the multiple-logics approach to human reasoning outlined in
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008). It is widely accepted inmod-
ern logic that there are many logics which capture many kinds
of reasoning, often incompatible one with another. They are best
thought of as mathematical models of pure archetypes of reason-
ing. Logics have been around for a while, however, with notable
exceptions, psychology still mostly uses only classical (“textbook”
logic) and probability logics, and often rejects the idea that the
latter even is a logic. What goes for logics goes more generally
for formal systems used for modeling cognition. We therefore
begin by providing some triangulation points better known to
psychologists that relate this framework to possibly more familiar
territory.
Todd et al. (2012) have proposed a multiple heuristics
approach to decision making which makes the choice of alterna-
tive methods a contextualized choice, and in this shares important
features with our multiple-systems approach to reasoning. The
resulting norms are content-dependent as argued by Gigerenzer
(2001). Bayesian models are often viewed as the established norm
in decision, as well as more recently in reasoning. Todd et al.
(2012) argue against the universality of a probabilistic norm. The
heuristics proposed are specialized, and logics are at a somewhat
different level of analysis, so not easy to compare, but never-
theless the two approaches are more closely related than may at
first appear. Existing neural networks which implement the non-
monotonic logic we use, Logic Programming (LP) (Stenning and
van Lambalgen, 2008, chapter 7), along with the internal gen-
eration of statistics of the networks’ operation, can supply the
theory-relative conditional frequency information that is required
to select for these heuristics the content that they require in con-
text. The networks also provide lists of defeaters—conditions
that defeat conditional inferences and contribute to determin-
ing confidence in causal conditional reasoning (Cummins, 1995).
This therefore offers a qualitative system of graded uncertainty in
intensional reasoning which is a competitor to Bayesian methods
in some contexts, through implementing the decision heuristics
just mentioned.
Stich (1990) “The Fragmentation of Reason” and this author’s
work more generally on cognitive pluralism, is chiefly focussed
on cases where different people (or peoples) have different norms
of reasoning for some reason of individual or cultural preference
or habit. We are focussed on cases in which participants’ various
goals call for different logics or systems of reasoning in different
contexts. At least at first pass, on our account, everyone ought to
conform to the constitutive norms of classical logic if their goals
are, say, classical mathematical proof or the settlement of a certain
kind of dispute. Everyone ought to conform to the norms of some
nonmonotonic logic such as LP if their goal is to tell a story.
Everyone ought to conform to the norms of deontic logic if they
want to reason about permissions and obligations. And so on. So,
our proposal is not relativistic in the usual sense. It is relativistic
only in the sense that people’s goals and therefore their norms are
variable in different contexts. This does not diminish the inter-
est of Stich’s topic, nor of the two topics’ relatedness. Widlok
and Stenning (submitted) sketch how a multiple-logics approach
bears on the recurrent anthropological debate about whether dif-
ferent cultures have different logics. Using nonmonotonic LP to
analyse the Mambila’s discourse of divination by spider, it con-
cludes that cultures vary in the social circumstances in which they
bring logics to bear, but that a working hypothesis should be that
they evidence the same range of logics in the range of contexts
they experience. Spider divination in context looks a whole lot
less irrational through these eyes.
Clearly many authors have proposed many heterogeneities in
reasoning, such as what is conventionally meant by the phrase
“individual differences” in psychology, individual variation in
how “good” some performance is. We are here concerned with
a specific type of (in)homogeneity of formal system (e.g., classi-
cal logic, probability, nonmonotonic logic, . . . ). Elqayam (2012)
proposes grounded rationality—essentially the avowedly uncon-
troversial proposal that there is more to rational reasoning and
action than the adoption of a formal system. There is more
because people differ in their cognitive capacities, cognitive costs,
mundane aims, and all the other variables of bounded rationality,
and more. Elqayam (2012) appears to associate normativism with
the adoption of a single formal standard of reasoning (usually
either classical logic or probability in some form), and proposes
“descriptivism” as an alternative that can preserve variety. So we
agree there is more to rational action than logics or formal sys-
tems, and that adoption of a single system is a mistake. But we
disagree that “descriptivism” can be conceived as an alternative to
multiple-systems, and propose that the mundane limitations of
grounded and bounded rationality interact with the unavoidable
choice of reasoning system among the other systems that are also
required. It is this interaction that provides great opportunity and
power to the empirical investigation of reasoning and rationality.
Description is of course important, but is always theory- and goal-
relative. Since there are many theories and goals, there are many
descriptions, and description itself cannot solve the inevitable
choice of interpretation problem.
Bounded rationality is a proposal (which we applaud) that
rational action has to be understood as governed by the inter-
section of many systematic constraints. To take one of Simon’s
examples (Simon, 1972), if working memory limitations are an
important bound on a particular reasoning task, then a theory of
working memory will be required to intersect with the cognitive
implementation of whatever reasoning system is at work, in order
to understand how contextual features (whether we have pencil
and paper, whether we are expert in the domain, . . . ) affect per-
formance, and therefore what constitutes rational action for us
in context. Countless social bounds are also sources of systematic
constraint. Many relevant features of any particular situation may
be entirely due to coincidence, but their operation is nevertheless
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to be understood in terms of several systematic theories. Totally
unsystematic constraints are not comprehensible, by hypothe-
sis. Thus bounded (or grounded) rationality requires multiple
simultaneous systematic formal accounts of all the relevant con-
straints. With these systems come constitutive norms; and with
those constitutive norms come regulative norms. The fact that we
are not currently in a position to specify the many systematic con-
straints in general terms, and that we can make some progress
with rather ad hoc accounts of say working memory, does not
make a theory of bounded rationality able to dispense with these
intersecting generalizations1. Boundedness does not make ratio-
nality ad hoc. The boundedness of working memory may or may
not be there because we ought to be bounded in memory (though
see, for example, Hertwig and Todd, 2005 and MacGregor, 1987
where advantages of boundedness are proposed) but it generates
regulative norms such as: for an important reasoning task that
clearly overloads your unaided working memory, it is not ratio-
nal, other things being equal, not to have a pencil and paper
to hand. Although we deliberately use examples of norms aris-
ing from individual reasoning because they are how experimental
psychology generally meets up with normative considerations, it
is not hard to see that the regulative norms arising from the con-
stitutive norms of the formal elements can rapidly reach into any
social, ethical or political activity people engage in.
As yet another orientation point, we recall that more than
one logic may operate within an activity. Elsewhere we have pro-
posed that an account of how at least some kinds of argument
work, requires an account of how adversarial classical and coop-
erative nonmonotonic logics have to work together (Stenning,
2002, chapter 5, Stenning, 2012) to capture the interplay between
cooperative and adversarial relations in argument. Mercier and
Sperber (2011) propose that reasoning evolved for argumenta-
tion. These authors define reasoning with respect to explicitly
aware processes, relegating unconscious processes to mere “infer-
ence.” On our account, accounting for argumentation that calls
on both non monotonic and monotonic logics means bridging
what Mercier and Sperber divide between inference and reason-
ing. One might propose that once cooperative discourse became
possible, argumentation about its interpretation inevitably fol-
lowed, for monitoring and repairing breakdowns in understand-
ing. Argumentation is inconceivable without the existence of
cooperative discourse. Elsewhere, we have criticized adaptation-
ist attempts to try to read evolutionary accounts from informal
descriptions of current function (Stenning and van Lambalgen,
2008, chapter 6). What is first required is a deeper description of
the phenotype: and that requires empirical description of goals
and norms.
The plan of this paper is that the first section discusses norms
as we understand them, and how they are incompatible with any
1For example, one of the prominent accounts of long-term/working-memory
interactions (Anderson, 1983) contains a production system which is a spe-
cific implementation of LP, the nonmonotonic logic we employ here. So logic
is also not so distant from the WM component of bounded rationality. Many
psychologists regard retrieval of relevant information from long-term mem-
ory as memory rather than reasoning. It is certainly memory, but equally
certainly reasoning.
pure descriptivism.We will concentrate on how participants’ very
own reasoning goals create variety in internal norms which need
to be captured in logics before any data of reasoning becomes
interpretable, and draw out some consequences for empirical
research. If normativity itself is not the problem, it is not without
its abuses. We see the homogeneous application of formal systems
as a major problem. Once only one system is allowed (whether it
is Bayesianism, or classical logic, or whatever) then there is no
way of assessing why a system is an appropriate choice for mod-
eling an instance of reasoning. It cannot be an appropriate choice
because it is no longer a choice. If there is heterogeneity (many
logics or other competence models) then there have to be criteria
of application, and indeed choice can be made on instrumen-
tal grounds—that is by a match between logical properties and
reasoning goals, as we illustrate.
The second section takes the psychological study of categori-
cal syllogistic reasoning as an example to illustrate these points. It
argues that the descriptivism prevailing for the last half of the 20th
century was exactly what led to a catastrophic inattention to the
participants’ reasoning goals. It describes the pervasive ambiguity
of reasoning experiments for participants, most of whom adopt
nonmonotonic reasoning goals where experimenters assumed
classical logical ones. It spells out how the contrasting rea-
soning goals are constituted in the properties of these two
logics.
The distinctive properties of classical logic give guidance for
design of a context which should improve the chances that we
see classical reasoning—in this case a context of dispute. Some
results from an ongoing experimental program show how the
properties of classical logic which make it suitable for a model
of a certain kind of dispute or demonstration are presented as
a first indication of the rewards of this kind of empirical pro-
gram. It provides clear evidence that this context produces more
classical reasoning than the conventional draw-a-conclusion task.
And perhaps more importantly, it shows how participants have
surprising implicit knowledge of some of the peculiarities of
classical logic. Psychologically, our goal should be assessing peo-
ples’ implicit knowledge and its contextual expression i.e., their
implicit logical concepts, rather than their scores on some fixed-
context arbitrary task which engenders variable and unspecified
goals.
The third section pursues similar themes in the example of
probabilistic reasoning. The idea that Bayesianism, or even prob-
ability, provides a new homogeneous norm for human reasoning,
and for rational action in general, has supplanted the same role
that was previously assigned to classical logic in theories of ratio-
nality. But probability theory fails to provide reasoning goals at
levels comparable to the examples of the previous section. What
is argued for is an analogous differentiation of “probability log-
ics” to apply to different reasoning goals, bridging to neighboring
logics in a friendly welcoming manner.
Finally we end with some conclusions about the empirical
programs that should follow from our arguments for a multiple-
logics view of human reasoning, based on the differentiated
reasoning goals that this multiplicity affords, together with some
comments about the very different view of the relation between
logic and psychology which emerges.
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2. EXPLAINING NORMATIVITY
The experimental work discussed in the next two sections is
intended to emphasis the role of normativity in the psychology
of reasoning and should be read as such. It becomes for this rea-
son important that we clarify what wemean by “normativity” and
we will do this by reference to Elqayam and Evans (2011) which
argues for descriptive as opposed to normative approaches and
encapsulates our main focus. This article was followed by a series
of commentaries some of which present views that are close to
the points we make here. But we find that in many cases the pic-
ture is rather blurred and clarification of the key concepts is much
needed so that points of agreement or disagreement can be identi-
fied and an essential discussion on the foundations of psychology
of reasoning can get off the ground. Importantly, many of the
arguments put forward against the use of normative frameworks
depend on a specific understanding of “normativity,” which we
would like to challenge2.
Logic is often said to be a normative system contrasted
with descriptive frameworks that psychologists use. But a logical
framework in itself is not descriptive or normative; it is the use of a
logic that can be descriptive or normative, and even classical logic
can serve as a descriptive tool in situations where people are found
to reason classically. As we discuss later, such situations do not
only arise in specialized contexts such as mathematical reason-
ing but may be found in research areas as prominent as syllogism
tasks or natural language conditional statements. The interesting,
indeed normative, question then is what are the circumstances, if
there are any, that trigger classical reasoning, and make it appro-
priate in the situation: when is CL adopted by the participant as
their norm for the task? We will discuss how classical logic, and
especially those characteristics of it that distinguish it from other
formal frameworks, provide cues as to where to look for the goals
that may make it appropriate. The same goes for any other logic
or formal system.
The role of normativity in questions such as the one just
stated is clearly not of the evaluative kind. Contrast this with the
following:
“A normative theory asks evaluative ‘ought’ questions: ‘What
ought to be the good use of negation in language?’ A normative
approach contains an element of evaluation, a sense of ‘good-
ness’ and ‘badness’, or ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, that is absent from
a purely competence account. In short, normative theories are
‘ought’-type theories; computational theories are ‘is’-type theo-
ries. Note that the competence theories and performance theories
are both descriptive—what they share is the is. ” (Elqayam and
Evans, 2011), p.239
Here the term “normative” takes on almost ethical connotations.
To be sure, such questions of prescriptive “goodness” and “bad-
ness” are at best outdated and in any case certainly irrelevant to
2For what Elqayam and Evans (2011) argue against, the term “normativism”
seems to us more appropriate than “normativity.” This is indeed the term that
these authors use, while many of the commentators talk about “normativity.”
This is not to say that the differences of opinion are merely terminological; it
is rather the choice of key terms that is influenced by the theoretical positions
adopted.
the study of human reasoning. Not so, however, for “right” and
“wrong” questions, as witnessed, for example, when participants
report “errors” in their own reasoning and correct themselves in
the process (we see an example later in how people reason about
uncertain conditionals). There is nothing ethically objectionable
or evaluative to supposing that humans are not perfect thinking
machines and sometimes commit errors or refrain from driving
their reasoning all the way to its utmost consequences3. and the
notion of “error” makes little sense outside a normative frame-
work that specifies what counts as “right” inferencing and what
as “wrong.” The pertinent question is rather: how can we talk
about “correctness,” or “right” and “wrong,” without falling into
the same old trap as when psychologists considered classical logic
to be the arbitrer of human rationality?
Most of the reluctance to engage seriously with normative
considerations comes from an understanding of norms as “exter-
nal” to one’s reasoning, that is, as set by someone other than the
participant herself (often researchers). Objections to normativity
disappear as soon as attention shifts to norms that are constitutive
of one’s own reasoning, meaning that they help define reasoning
for what it is4. We do not deny that norms ‘set by other peo-
ple’ (social norms) are important. But if it is only such norms
that are objectionable the debate has been ill-specified, and the
objections to norms should be suitably diluted. A way to trace
“internal” norms is to identify the goals that underlie and drive
one’s reasoning process. Goals are highly complex and not easy to
specify as they stem from various sources. They are not observ-
able and they interact with each other in complicated ways. In
reasoning experiments, for example, the participant has to decide
how to go about solving the task, which depends on the par-
ticipant’s interpretation of what is asked of her, which in turn
depends on pragmatic goals influencing natural language pro-
cessing of instructions, how much is underdetermined by the
experimenter’s design and so on. But whatever the underlying
goals turn out to be, it has to be recognized that they heavily
influence the type of reasoning participants engage in. In the next
section we discuss concrete examples of how different goals trig-
ger different reasoning processes, and we show this by varying
the context in order to generate different types of reasoning (and
thereby different reasoning norms) and study the effects of this
variation on the experimental data.
With the understanding of normativity that we propose as
“internal” and not “external” to reasoning, the discussion of
human rationality can be set on new grounds. Consider the
following:
What seems to set apart normative rationality from other types of
rationality is the “ougthness” involved in normativism. Bounded
rationality, for example, is not bounded because it “ought” to be
so. Instead, there are just biological limits to how large brains can
3The authors seem to take issue with the concept of “error” because it evi-
dences the use of norms: ‘While the term “normative” has been dropped, the
term “error” has not: A recent book (Stanovich, 2009) presents an extensive
discussion of the source of reasoning and decision-making errors, implying
norms’. (Elqayam and Evans, 2011), p.242
4We discuss constitutive and regulative norms and their relations also in
Achourioti et al. (2011).
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grow and how much information and how many computational
algorithms they can store and execute.’ (Elqayam and Evans, 2011),
p. 236
As mentioned above, even this is contentious in the literature:
there may be distinct advantages to limited systems, and there is
much evidence that human brain-size is under selective pressure
from both directions. But we accept that resource bounds are a
fact. Resource constraints certainly influence the reasoning that
participants engage in; this is one of the reasons that may ren-
der classical model theoretic thinking intractable and force naive
participants to resort to nonmonotonic example construction
through preferred models, that leads to more manageable com-
putational processes. But notice that participants are switching
reasoning subgoals, not attempting the same goal with a differ-
ent tool. Such limitations are part of what a formal model helps
represent. They lie, for example, at the heart of the difference
between monotonic and nonmonotonic systems. And justifying
one model rather than another is clear evidence of normative
status, even if the norms in this case could not be otherwise
because of resource bounds. Elqayam and Evans (2011) follow
Evans and Over (1996) in setting apart “normative” rationality
from “instrumental,” “bounded,” “ecological” and “evolutionary”
rationality. The way we understand normativity, it is integral part
of all of these four types of rationality. In fact, most of the present
paper discusses norms that are part of so-called “instrumental
rationality.” Hence, we take issue with remarks as the following:
‘Some researchers have proposed that we should adopt alternative
normative systems such as those based on information, probabil-
ity, or decision theory (Oaksford and Chater, 1991, 1998a,b, 2007),
while others proposed that at least some forms of rationality need
not necessarily require a normative system at all (e.g. Evans, 1993,
2002; Evans and Over, 1996; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). By this
position, organisms are rational if they act in such a manner as to
achieve personal goals, and such rationality need not involve any
normative rule following.’ (Elqayam and Evans, 2011), p.234
Themessage here is that achieving personal goals need not involve
normative rule following. It must be clear by now that we take
reasoning goals to be intrinsically normative in that they play a
big role in the choice of one reasoning mode rather than another
(without claiming that some conscious decision-making process
of selection takes place, or that they are necessarily constituted
as such in “rules”). Pragmatic goals of relevance, for example,
are essentially normative when in some contexts they exclude
the interpretation of a natural language “or” as the classical
logic disjunction, ∨. Just as with the selection task, examina-
tion has to reveal these hidden normative systems behind, for
example, ecological rationality. Martignon and Krauss (2003)
argue that Gigerenzer’s heuristics require Bayesian methods for
their population with content in context. And Martignon et al.
(in preparation) give an account of this same process based on
nonmonotonic logic. Ecological rationality is up to its ears in
normativity.
We have so far proposed an understanding of normativity as
applying to the use of formal systems rather than attaching to the
systems themselves and as involving questions of correctness that
do not have evaluative connotations but refer to norms which are
internal to human reasoning and constitutive of it. To clarify these
points even further, we now discuss the status of competence the-
ories and the “is-ought” fallacy which normative approaches are
said to commit. Here is an interesting quote:
‘. . . arbitrating between competing normative systems is both cru-
cial and far from easy. This is where the difference between
normative and competence theories becomes critical. Competence
theories are descriptive and can hence be supported by descrip-
tive evidence. In contrast, can one support normative theory with
descriptive evidence? Can one infer the ought from the is?’ (p. 240)
We do not agree that competence theories can be supported by
descriptive evidence without normative considerations. It is espe-
cially competence theories that have to see beyond the data in
order to account for the discrepancy between theory and obser-
vation. And at the same time it is a truism that the further one
moves away from observable data the more difficult it becomes
to actually test the theory. So how is it possible at once to
model competence and stay as close as possible to actual per-
formance? Competence theories have constitutive norms, and
these norms generate regulative norms once their reasoning is
embedded in action. Our examples in the next sections show
how the various constitutive norms participants adopt for syllo-
gistic and probabilistic reasoning (competence theories) generate
regulative norms once embedded in actual reasoning. A proper
understanding of the data depends on the choice of logical norm.
Elqayam and Evans (2011) argue that much of the experi-
mental cognitive research is liable to the “is-ought” fallacy (or
naturalistic fallacy as it is often called by philosophers). However,
in order for this transition from “is” to “ought” to make sense,
“is” and “ought” must be clearly separated, and we show in this
paper that descriptive and normative matters cannot be so neatly
set apart. A purely descriptive approach is simply unattainable,
since what the participants “do” already depends on the theoret-
ical framework within which one performs the observation and
this theoretical framework must take into account the reason-
ing goals at hand, the latter clearly creating normative demands.
The dependence of description on formal theory is clearly seen
when incompatible descriptions match the same data; when, as
we discuss, for instance, the same answer to a reasoning task
could be generated by reasoning processes that are as different as
monotonic and nonmonotonic logics.
Interestingly, Elqayam and Evans (2011) take the “is-ought”
fallacy to be especially triggered in cases where more than one
theory matches the data, which then lends support to descrip-
tive theories in their approach5. But we believe that it is precisely
the need to select among equally matching theories that proves
descriptivism to be impossible, on the one hand, and what saves
the psychologist from the homogeneity trap, on the other. There
we think, is the real danger when studying human reasoning with-
out making explicit the norms and goals involved; namely, the
5It must be clear by now that we do not subscribe to a distinction of for-
mal systems into normative and descriptive; it is rather the use we put these
systems to in accounting for human reasoning that can be labeled as such.
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idea that a single theory can play the role of setting the basis,
descriptive or normative, over which to design and assess all
experimental work.
Having to arbitrate between formal models is not in itself a
problemwe should want to eliminate, but it becomes such a prob-
lem if it means having to choose between theories that claim to
explain human reasoning as a whole. This is where a multiple-
logics approach as advocated here offers an improvement in the
way formal models are used: in order to account for differences
between participants’ reasoning within a particular task, we ask
ourselves how we can modify the task so that these differences
become apparent. This we find the most interesting experimental
challenge, which relies, however, on being open to different for-
malizations sensitive to participants’ underlying norms and goals.
Formalizing involves representation of reasoning norms (which
are goal-sensitive) as much as empirical engagement. And here is
where a single descriptive framework, even if that were possible, is
bound to fail: it offers no way to account for pervasive participant
differences flowing from different goals, if all one is allowed to do
is to “describe” participants’ micro-behavior.
3. THE SYLLOGISM AS ILLUSTRATION
3.1. REASONING GOALS AS NORMS EMBODIED IN FORMAL SYSTEMS
The earliest paper on the psychology of the syllogism by Störring
(1908) does not address the relation between logic and psychol-
ogy at all, but employing great logical and psychological insight
gets on with describing a small number of participants’ responses
to syllogistic problems. It identifies Aristotle’s ekthesis as a good
guide to participants’ reasoning processes. This itself is remark-
able, coming so soon after the “divorce” of logic and psychology,
and the establishment of the latter as experimental science. By
mid-century, Wason (1968) argues strongly against the very idea
that logic bears any useful relation to human reasoning, claiming
to demonstrate this fact experimentally with Piaget’s theory as his
target.
It was a further half century before Wason’s interpretation
of his experiment was prominently challenged in psychology
(Chater and Oaksford, 1999; Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2001;
Evans, 2002; Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2004) (but see also
Wetherick, 1970) by showing how it rested on the assumption
that classical logic had to be the goal of participants’ supposedly
failed reasoning inWason’s Task, for any of his arguments for irra-
tionality to succeed. But it behooves someone so vehement that
logic contributes nothing to understanding human reasoning to
perhaps find out what constitutes a logic. This simultaneous cou-
pling of explicit denial of the relevance of classical logic, with its
under-the-counter adoption as the criterion of correct reasoning,
stems directly from an avoidance of the issue of participants’ goals
in reasoning, and this in turn is a direct result of the suppression
of formal specifications of reasoning goals, in favor of a proposed
descriptivism treating “human reasoning” as an activity with a
homogeneous goal. Wherever descriptivism is espoused we find
tacit appeal to homogenous normativism.
As we shall see in our example of the syllogism, it is a difficult
experimental question to even specify what empirical evidence
is required to distinguish between monotonic and nonmono-
tonic reasoning in the syllogistic fragment. It has been assumed
that merely instructing different reasoning criteria is sufficient
to discriminate. The empirical problems of discriminating these
goals has been largely ignored or denied, and their neglect stems
directly from conflict of this difficulty of observation with the
descriptivism which we lament. Once a formal specification of an
alternative interpretation of the task is available, it is possible to
launch a genuine empirical exploration of what participants may
be trying to do.
It is not difficult to see why a multiple-logics stance defuses
accusations of prescriptive normativism. As soon as there is
explicitly acknowledged plurality, then the need for specification
of appropriateness conditions for the different logics is clear for
all to see. Fortunately, multiplicity brings with it the materials
for an answer. Why is classical logic a good model for adver-
sarial reasoning such as the settlement of dispute? Well, it is
bivalent, admitting no intermediate truth values. It is extensional,
which means the relevant questions of meaning are easily iden-
tified, if not necessarily decided, in agreeing premises. It is truth
functional, with similar consequences—no hidden meanings can
obscure the connection intended by an intensional conditional.
It reasons from identified premises with fixed interpretations.
Wandering premises are not good for dispute resolution. But
above all, its concept of validity requires the preservation of truth
in conclusions from true premises under all assignments of truth
values.
Why is Logic Programming a good logic for cooperative rea-
soning about the effect on our preferred model of knowledge
rich interpretation of new information? Well, the knowledge-base
of conditionals corresponds to the long term regularities in the
environment, along with the numerous exceptions to these regu-
larities. Working memory holds the representation of the current
preferred model of the focal situation (the “closed world”). The
closure of the world is made possible by the restriction of expres-
sion which allows the rapid settlement of whether a particular
proposition can be derived from the large knowledge base. And
so on. Even these partial descriptions of the differences between
the logics are enough to explain for many contexts whether clas-
sical or a nonmonotonic logic is appropriate. The norm can be
seen to be appropriate to the goal. It is when human reasoning
is assumed to be logically homogeneous, lack of adequate jus-
tification is inevitable. For example, there is a pervasive though
not universal view in the psychology of reasoning that mono-
tonic and nonmonotonic logics are two ways of “doing the same
thing,” where the nonmonotonic logic is seen as a poor man’s
approximation to classical logic. For example, Mental Models
theory correctly asserts that to achieve classical reasoning, partic-
ipants should consider all models of the premises in syllogistic
reasoning. But when it is clear that they mostly actually only
consider one model, this is considered a performance error (for-
getfulness): not a symptom of nonmonotonic goals to identify
a preferred model. This is accompanied by separate experimen-
tal demonstrations that participants can successfully search for
counterexample models when explicitly instructed to do so, in
a quite different task. This is taken as supporting that indeed
the failure to look for them in solving syllogisms is a perfor-
mance error. At no point is it questioned whether the participants’
goal is different in these two tasks. Just because people can do
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counterexample reasoning sometimes, does not mean that this is
always their goal.
The LP machinery may often operate below awareness; this
does not mean that the participant who adopted the goal that it
performs does not “have” the goals under which it operates. And
plurality is absolutely required for other reasons. There is no way
that any logic can provide a model of both dispute and exposition
because the logical properties listed above are incompatible6.
From these arguments it follows that pure descriptivism is
impossible in situations where both CL and LP are live options
for participants’ interpretation (most laboratory reasoning tasks)
because choice of logic, and with it reasoning goals, is required
for interpretation of the data. There is no alternative to seek-
ing evidence for which goals the participant has adopted (usually
inexplicitly). Merely varying the instructions is not an adequate
tool for discovery.
3.2. DESCRIPTIVIST APPROACHES TO THE SYLLOGISM CANNOT
DISCRIMINATE THESE GOALS
There are 64 pairs of syllogistic premises which can be enumer-
ated with their valid conclusions. There are a some logical glitches
about exactly what ought to be listed as valid 7. The conventional
task for studying “syllogistic reasoning” is defined by the goal of
“getting these answers” to the question “What follows from these
premises?” For example, if the premises are All A are B. All B are C
then All A are C is a valid conclusion. So participants who answer
with this conclusion score a point. This is OK as far as it goes as
an denationalization, but if it is all we can offer, then it makes the
syllogism an uninteresting pursuit for the researcher and partici-
pant alike. Who says these ones are valid? So it is generally further
assumed by the experimenter that these right answers are given
by classical logic—was not Aristotle, the author of the first logical
theory of syllogisms, thereby the inventor of classical logic?—but
pure descriptivism is already out the window. CL has constitutive
norms, and with them its users and uses acquire regulative norms.
Troubles compound. These participants have been selected for
not knowing explicitly what the syllogism, or classical logic, are.
It is true that they know the natural language of the premises,
and it is easy to suppose that this determines the reasoning goal.
But it is the discourse that they have trouble understanding out
of context. And they often complain about the bizarreness of
the discourse in ways that make one think they in fact adopt a
goal quite different to the one the experimenter stipulates. For
example, given Some A are B. Some C are B they frequently com-
plain that “it doesn’t tell me whether the Bs are the same or
different.” This complaint makes no sense if the premises are
understood “classically.” Classically it is absolutely clear that they
could be either the same or different unless the quantifiers force
them to be related, and in this case they “obviously” do not. Yet
about 60% of participants claim that there is a valid conclusion
6Logicians produce “embedding theorems” which prove that one logic can be
“embedded” within another, often when the two look rather incompatible. It
does not follow that the more encompassing logic is an appropriate cognitive
model for the encompassed systems’ cognitive applications.
7These “glitches” turn out to be at the heart of some of the psychological issues
about CL: more below.
here8 On a “story-understanding” LP interpretation, they are of
course right that the discourse is “defective” and there are ways
of fixing it so that there are valid conclusions based on preferred
models—several ways.
So we do not yet know what the participants’ goals are at any
level beyond assuming they are to please the experimenter, who
has not been good enough to divulge his goals in a way that the
participant can interpret them. Just saying “I want what logically
follows” or “what must be true” is not helpful, since “logically”
has many meanings in the vernacular (“reason carefully” is often
a good gloss), and any participants who have taken intro logic
have been weeded out. “Logically” also has many technical mean-
ings. In LP, a conclusion must be true (in the current context) if
it follows in the current context from the preferred model. The
psychological effects of this kind of emphatic instruction are con-
gruent with the idea that participants take a little more care with
whatever goals they happen to have.
Why should we care? What clarification of the goals of the par-
ticipants would make the syllogism more interesting? We should
care about the syllogism because it is a suitable microcosm for
seeking the psychological foundations of classical logical rea-
soning, if any, and that is interesting because classical logic is
a crucial mathematical model of dispute or demonstration. So
we should be interested in how we can characterize reasoning
in this task in a way that it will bear some useful relation to
reasoning outside this tiny domain, in say first-order classical
logic, or even the much smaller, monadic first-order logic. This
would be interesting. Tasks are not themselves interesting if there
is no way of connecting them outside the laboratory or across
domains. Small fragments are good for satisfying the exigencies
of experiment, but they are of little interest in themselves. A good
fragment generalizes—and for that one needs to know the goals
(and norms) of the participant. There are also significant practical
educational gains in understanding exactly why it is that partic-
ipants have trouble differentiating the discourses of two logics.
These problems are close to well known problems of mathemat-
ics education in distinguishing generation of examples from that
of proofs (Stenning, 2002, chapter 5).
The real problem in this example is that there is more
than one systematic reasoning goal that participants might
adopt in doing the task as set—that is, more than one logic
that might apply. The complaint quoted above is one clue
here, though there are many others. The complaint is consis-
tent with the idea that participants are adopting what might
be called a “story understanding” task: roughly “What is the
model of these premises which their author (presumably the
experimenter) intends me to understand by them?” In non-
monotonic logics that capture this reasoning process, these are
usually referred to as the preferred model (Shoham, 1987). This
is cooperative nonmonotonic reasoning to a unique minimal
model (i.e., one interpretation of the premises), as opposed
to the adversarial monotonic reasoning from an interpretation,
to conclusions true in all possible models, that classical logic
specifies.
8Percentage responses here and following are taken from the metanalysis by
Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2012).
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The proposal that cooperative communication worked
through the contruction by speaker and hearer of what is now
known as a “preferred model” appeared in Stenning (1975) and
was condensed in Stenning (1978). Nonmontonic logic was new
(McCarthy, 1980), and preferred models had to wait several more
years (Shoham, 1987), but what was proposed informally was a
direct route to cooperation for psychological process accounts
(rather than an indirect Gricean pragmatics founded on adversar-
ial classical logic). Stenning and Yule (1997) showed how subtle is
the empirical discrimination of reasoning in classical logic and
reasoning in nonmonotonic logic in the microcosms of the syllo-
gism. The “Source-Founding Model” described there is a “shell”
for capturing syllogistic reasoning processes, and it demonstrated
that adopting a “guess the intended model” reasoning goal could
actually yield all and only valid classical logical conclusions if the
right model (roughly the “weakest”) was chosen, without any
conceptual change to a new logic. The interesting psychologi-
cal conceptual problems are about bald conceptual differences,
but are actually difficult to resolve experimentally because the
syllogism is so inexpressive. There is considerable evidence that
most of the success participants achieve in syllogistic reasoning
is achieved by preferred model construction. This is an exam-
ple of the central importance of the empirical study of goals to
the psychology of reasoning. Evans (2002) picks up the point
about monotonic and nonmonotonic goals and about interpreta-
tion, but suggests no empirical approach other than variation in
narrow instructions (rather than tasks) which Stenning and Yule
(1997) showed to be inadequate.
It is an immediate consequence that merely observing scores
on the 64 syllogisms under different instructions in the con-
ventional draw-a-conclusion task, will not tell us what logic a
participant is reasoning with. We have to address the logical con-
cepts that they have (for example, attitudes to conditionals with
empty antecedents—more presently) and with them their pro-
cesses of reasoning.We beg the reader’s patience with some details
which are important for understanding the role distinct goals
(embodying distinct norms) play. We will use the diagrammatic
methods this reference uses, though it also supplies analogous
sentential ones. So for example, the syllogism All A are B. Some
C are not B is represented by Figure 1.
In the final diagram, the single cross marks an element which
is C but not A or B, which must exist in any model where the
premises are true9. The choice of preferred models in the dia-
grams of each premise, combines with this construction of all
consistent sub-regions, and with the rules for retaining or deleting
the crosses, to ensure the result that any remaining cross repre-
sents an arbitrary individual with the properties defined by its
subregion. The surprise is that this individual classically must
exist if the premises are true. That is, the rules for choosing the
nonmonotonically “preferred” model can conspire, in this tiny
fragment of classical logic, to choose a model for the premises
9The diagrammatic system is described in more detail in the reference above
and also in Stenning and Oberlander (1995), e.g., Figure 2. In the variant
used here, existential presuppositions are made for universals, because that
assumption is commonplace in the psychology literature. Below we see that it
is not clearly the right assumption when the task context changes to dispute.
FIGURE 1 | Two premise diagrams unified in the Euler’s Circles system
of Stenning and Yule (1997). The crosses mark non-empty subregions. In
the unified diagram, the A and C circles must be arranged to create the
maximum number of minimal sub-regions compatible with the premises. In
this case the A and C circles must intersect. Crosses whose minimal
sub-region in the premise diagram have been bisected in this unification
operation are deleted. Remaining crosses mark minimal models, and
thereby indicate classically valid conclusions.
which has to exist in any situation where premises are true i.e., is
a classically valid conclusion. This is of course not to say that par-
ticipants who adopt a generally nonmonotonic goal for the task
will automatically adopt the particular procedures required for
getting classically valid preferred models: there are many parame-
terizations of the tweaking of nonmonotonic strategy. Informally,
participants have to prefer the “weakest” model.
Stenning and Yule (1997) also provides a sentential algorithm
which mirrors this graphical algorithm, as well as a “Source-
Founding method” which is an abstract algorithmwhich captures
what is in common between nonmontonic and classical meth-
ods. It shows the equivalence of the model manipulations in
the diagrams with Aristotle’s ekthesis. So it will be impossi-
ble to empirically distinguish participants’ with classical norms
from those with these “correctly tweaked” nonmonotonic rea-
soning norms by merely inspecting input premises and output
conclusions. Yet identifying these norms is just what we argued
psychology has to do to establish what implicit grasp of classical
logic its participants have.
But help lies at hand. What has happened, in our nonmono-
tonic alternative method, to all those paradoxical properties
of classical logic that bother every introductory logic student
so much? For example, the paradoxes of material implication,
whereby, from ¬p it follows that p → q; and from q it also fol-
lows that p → q. Or, for a related example, the conclusion that the
King of France has been bald since the Revolution because there
has been no King of France?: the problem of existential presup-
positions. Besides, if the nonmonotonic tweaks get the classical
answers, who needs to put up with these crises of classical logic?
So what is the psychological bottom line? The psychological
half-way line, is that who needs classical logic is anyone who
wants to go beyond the syllogism into the vastly more expres-
sive first-order logic, and needs this still important model of
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demonstration and rational dispute (e.g., for mathematics, sci-
ence, politics or the law). An experimenter might be tempted
to the conclusion that this was just a bad fragment to pick,
and progress to the psychological study of first-order or at least
monadic first-order logic. There are formidable obstacles on that
path, and no one has ventured down it far. But there is an
alternative strategy within the syllogism. How can we get data
richer than input-output pairings of premise-pairs and conclu-
sions? If the conventional psychological task of presenting a pair
of premises and asking whether any, and which of, the eight
conclusions follows, brings forth nonmonotonic norms (albeit
sometimes refined ones) from most participants, then perhaps
what is needed is a new task and task context (dispute per-
haps)? And what about getting participants to perform not just
inferences, but also demonstrations of those inferences (by pro-
ducing counterexamples)? This would provide evidence beyond
input-output functions.
What are the quintessential features of classical reasoning that
we should focus on in the data? The clues are in the paradoxes,
though it requires some digging to unearth them. We are claim-
ing, as is commonplace in traditional logical discussion, that
classical logic is a model of dispute. What does this mean? Its
concept of validity is that valid conclusions must be true in all
models of the premises. What this means is that there must be
no counterexamples (or “countermodels”). So classical logical
demonstration is a doubly negative affair. One has to search for
the absence of counterexamples, and what is more, search exhaus-
tively. A dispute starts from agreed and fixed premises, considers
all situations in which these are all true, and wants to be certain
that inference introduces no falsehood. The paradoxes of mate-
rial implication immediately disappear. If p is false, then p ⊃ q
cannot be false (its truth-table reveals that it can only be false if
both p is true and q is false. (And truth tables is all there is to
truth-functions). And the same if q is true. So given that p is false
or q is true, we cannot introduce falsehood to true premises by
concluding q from p ⊃ q. Everything follows from the nature of
this kind of dispute, in which the premises must be isolated from
other knowledge because they must be explicitly agreed, and in
which no shifting of interpretation can be hidden in implications,
or indeed in predicates. This latter is ensured by extensional and
truth-functional interpretation. The “paradoxes” are thus seen
as paradoxical only from the vantage point of nonmonotonic
reasoning (our usual vantage point), whose norms of informa-
tiveness they violate. In dispute, proof and demonstration, the
last thing one wants is the informativeness of new information
smuggled in. And if you are engaged in telling a story, failing
to introduce new information in each addition to the story will
invoke incomprehension in your audience. Tautologies do little
for the plot. This contrast is what we mean by each logic having
its own discourse, and these two are incompatible.
Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999) earlier presented coun-
terexample construction as an explicitly instructed task using
syllogisms, though with a different partly graphical presentation
of situations. Their purposes were to refute the claims of Polk
and Newell (1995) that in the conventional draw-a-conclusion
task, participants do not search for counterexamples, as mental
models theory claimed that they understood that they should: ‘If
people are unable to refute conclusions in this way, then Polk
and Newell (1995) are certainly correct in arguing that refuta-
tions play little or no role in syllogistic reasoning’ (Bucciarelli
and Johnson-Laird, 1999, page 270). Whilst their investigations
of explicit countermodeling do, like ours, establish that partic-
ipants can, when instructed, find countermodels above chance,
they certainly do not counter Polk and Newell’s claim that par-
ticipants do not routinely do this in the conventional task on
whichmental models theory is based. Other evidence for Polk and
Newell’s skepticism now abounds (e.g., Newstead et al., 1999).
But nowhere do any of these authors explicitly consider whether
the participants’ goals of reasoning in countermovement diverge
from their goals of reasoning in the conventional task, even less
whether they exemplify two different logics. At this stage, Mental
Models theory was seen by its practitioners as the “fundamental
human reasoning mechanism.” Another example of our dictum
that it is exactly where homogeneity of reasoning is proposed, that
normativism goes off the rails.
Searching for an absence of counterexamples then, is the prim-
itive model-theoretic method of proof in the syllogism classically
interpreted. The whole notion of a counterexample to be most
natural, and best distinguished from an exception, needs a context
of dispute. How do we stage one of those in the lab? Well, we tried
the following (Achourioti and Stenning, in preparation). A nefar-
ious character calledHarry-the-Snake is at the fairground offering
bets on syllogistic conclusions. You always have the choice of
refusing the bets Harry offers, but if you think the conclusion
he proposes does not follow from his premises (i.e., is invalid),
then you should choose to bet against him. If you do so choose,
then you must also construct a counterexample to his conclusion.
Evidently we also have to explain to participants what we mean
by a counterexample (a situation which makes both premises true
and the conclusion false); what we mean by a situation (some
entities specified as with or without each of the three properties
A, B and C; and how to construct and record a counterexample.
(In fact we use contentful material that does not affect likeli-
hoods of truth of premises). Two features of this situation are
that Harry-the-Snake is absolutely not to be trusted, and that it
is adversarial—he is trying to empty your wallet. Another is that
you, the participant, have chosen to dispute the claim Harry has
made. You do not have to ask yourself “What if I thought this
did not follow?” It has a vividness and a directness which may
be important. Our selection of 32 syllogisms (unlike Bucciarelli
and Johnson-Laird’s) was designed to concentrate on the “no
valid conclusion” problems which are at the core of understand-
ing CL, and to allow analysis of the “mismatching” of positive and
negative middle terms.
Our most general prediction was an increased accuracy at
detecting non-valid conclusions. In the conventional task this is
extremely low (37%): highly significantly worse than chance: in
the new task it is 74%, significantly better than chance, and valid
problems are 66% correct, which is also above chance. Valid prob-
lems are now harder, but the task now focusses the participant on
the task intended. We also made some more specific predictions
about a particular class of syllogisms which we call “mismatched,”
in which the B-term is positive in one premise and negative
(i.e., predicate-negated) in the other. Mismatching middle-term
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double-existential problems (e.g., Some B are A, Some C are not-B)
“obviously” do not have single-element models, and so no valid
conclusions. Compare a corresponding matched case Some B are
A, Some C are B which yields as a unification model the single-
element: (ABC). The most popular conclusion is Some C are A,
drawn by 39% of participants. Note that this unification model
is not a countermodel of this conclusion. With the mismatched
example above, one cannot get a 1-elementmodel. This difference
between matched and mismatched double-existential problems
and their most popular conclusions is systematic, as we describe
below.
One might suppose that absence of valid conclusions is a
general property of mismatching syllogisms because of the uni-
fication barrier to 1-element models, until one thinks about what
happens if the first premise was instead All B are A. This univer-
sal premise would be satisfied by a single element model (such as
A not-B C). But only if the negated B term is accepted as mak-
ing the universal premise true by making its antecedent empty.
That is, by the very same model which countermodels the exis-
tential case. Here is one place where the connection between CL’s
“paradoxes” and matching/mismatching shows up. Participants
accepting the empty antecedent conditional as true can produce
this one-element model.
So mismatching may serve as a tracer for issues with empty-
antecedents. To find 1-element models for these mismatched
problems requires accepting empty-antecedent conditionals as
true. Now comes the question, do any of these syllogisms have
valid conclusions? They can have 1-element models if one accepts
empty antecedent conditionals, but are these models ones that
establish valid conclusions? This model does not establish a valid
conclusion anymore than the model (ABC) establishes a conclu-
sion for Some A are B. Some B are C. In fact the problem does have
a different valid conclusion Some A are not C. In summary, these
mismatched problems provide a way to gain information about
participants’ intuitive grasp of empty-antecedent conditionals.
And accepting empty-antecedent conditionals as true is a spe-
cial case of accepting the paradoxes of material implication—the
essential example of CL’s “weirdness”—in the context of dispute.
This is what we mean by looking for its “weirdnesses” as being the
best evidence of implicit grasp of a logic. CL is weird in disputes;
only from the non monotonic perspective, even for “logically
naive” subjects.
If a participant has some implicit grasp of the one-element
model generalization, and is happy with models satisfying con-
ditionals by making their antecedent empty, then mismatched
problems could behave differently than matched in this model-
theoretic search-for-counterexample method: the striking logi-
cal feature (empty-antecedent conditionals being true) connects
directly to an unexplored psychological feature. Mismatched
problems, when we do the analysis, are actually observed to be
slightly but significantly harder than matched ones in the con-
ventional task of constructing a conclusion. To see how they
might behave differently in countermodel search, one also needs
to consider what the favorite conclusions are in the conven-
tional task. For our example, the favorite response is No C are
A. Now, we observe, that the model one gets by unifying the
premises is (A not-B C) is immediately a countermodel of this
popular conclusion (ie. some C are A in this model). If we take
the matched and the mismatched problems in our experimental
sample of 32, each paired with its favorite conclusion (from the
meta-analysis), we find all the mismatched problems have this
property that the unification model countermodels the favorite
(and usually invalid) conclusions; whereas with the matched
problems, the unification model is, in each case a model of the
erroneous but favorite conclusion. This is evidently an empirical
psychological generalization (favorite conclusions in a particular
task have no logical status), though we clearly need the CLmodel-
theory to even notice this piece of psychology. We predicted
that when looking for countermodels (ie. doing CL), mismatched
problems should be easier than mismatched ones.
What actually happens when Harry shows up? To cut a long
story short, participants experience disputing with Harry-the-
Snake as a much more arduous task than the conventional draw-
a-conclusion task. They slow down by a factor of about three, an
observation that already casts doubt on claims that this counter-
model search takes place in the conventional task. Countermodel
reasoning is hard work. Their overall accuracy of judgment of
validity is not hugely increased, but it does not suffer from the
extreme asymmetry of the conventional task. Both VC and NVC
problems are done at a better than chance level. The control group
in our conventional task control group are also much better than
the literature average (these are highly selected students), but they
are still asymmetrical in their success in the same way with VC
easier than NVC problems. So we find the predicted improvement
in detecting invalid conclusions, and we find that indeed whereas
mismatched problems are somewhat harder than matched ones
on the conventional task, they are substantially easier in coun-
termodel reasoning in dispute with Harry, and that participants
show evidence of accepting empty antecedent conditionals as true
in the dispute task.
The pattern of errors in countermodel construction is consis-
tent with a process by which participants first try to construct
a premise model, then check to see if it is a countermodel, and
if it is not, then adjust it to try to achieve a falsification of the
conclusion. The problem appears to be that the adjustment often
yields a model that falsifies the conclusion but is no longer a
model of the premises. Mismatched models are more accurately
countermodeled, and this is because the models that result from
the unification of their premises are already countermodels of
Harry’s proposed conclusions, as illustrated above. This pattern
that mismatched problems are actually easier for countermodel
construction whereas they are harder in the conventional task
strongly suggests that the majority of participants in the con-
ventional task are operating proof-theoretically, probably by the
nonmonotonic methods discussed above.
The countermodel construction data provides rich evidence
that empty antecedent conditionals can be treated as true in this
context. If the data is scored requiring existential presuppositions,
most of the models produced for problems with one positive and
one negative universal (i.e., no explicit existential premise) are
not even models of the premises, let alone countermodels of the
conclusion. A final observation that supports this general inter-
pretation of a change of process invoked by dispute with Harry is
that the orders of difficulty of problems in the conventional and
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in the Harry tasks are actually uncorrelated—an extremely strong
result in support of the claim that here is the first task in the liter-
ature that produces substantial classical reasoning conducted on
a classical conceptual basis. But even here, there are still many
errors in countermodel reasoning. The usual justification of the
conventional task is that the order of the difficulty of problems
is systematic and always the same. The first time anyone makes
a comparison with a context designed to invoke a different logic,
one finds this order of difficulty changes radically.
Clarifying the intended goals of reasoning (norms to adopt)
for participants is one of the few ways we have of pursuing the
question whether there are contexts in which participants intu-
itively understand the concepts of a logic. One can imagine the
objection that we have told them to do countermodel reasoning
and so it is not surprising that they appear to reason classically.
But this is a psychologically bizarre idea. It’s no use telling these
participants to reason in classical logic because they do not explic-
itly know what that means. They do have some grasp of what a
dispute is, and the role of counterexamples therein—the discourse
of dispute. We are merely negotiating a common reasoning norm
with our participants. If they did not understand these things, the
negotiation would not succeed. We doubt it succeeds with all our
participants. But we certainly do not instruct them about what
to do with empty antecedent conditionals. And sure enough, we
see the peculiarities of classical logical reasoning in their perfor-
mance. This is just what the psychological foundations of classical
logic are: an inexplicit intuitive grasp of dispute. These empirical
conceptual questions such as “What do participants ‘know’ about
classical logic?” have far more psychological reach than questions
about howmany syllogisms do participants get “right” in any par-
ticular contextualized task where the goals are not understood the
same way by participant and experimenter, or across participants.
Participants are, unsurprisingly, not tactically expert. But here
at least is the beginning of an empirical program to study this
kind of reasoning in contradistinction to various kinds of non-
monotonic reasoning. Although the two may overlap within
the syllogism, outside the syllogism they diverge. And even
within the syllogism, here is evidence that the two very dif-
ferent reasoning goals are operative in different contexts, and
lead to radically different mental processes, each incomprehen-
sible without an understanding of the different logical goals, and
of the participants’ informal contextual understandings of their
logical goals.
4. REASONERS’ GOALS IN THE NEW PROBABILISTIC
PARADIGM
Classical logic has been found wanting as a complete model
of human inference for many reasons, some of which we have
already covered. The “new paradigm” of subjective probabilities
aspires to become its replacement (Over, 2009; Oaksford and
Chater, 2013). A central question has been whether people’s inter-
pretation of indicative conditionals, ‘if A, then B’, is given by the
material conditional A ⊃ B (see Table 1 for a reminder of its truth
values) or the conditional probability P(B|A). There is evidence
that in some circumstances participants do indeed reason that the
probability of ‘if A, then B’ is given by P(B|A), both when depen-
dencies between antecedent and consequent are expressed in the
Table 1 | Truth values of the classical logic material conditional
(A ⊃ B), conjunction (A ∧ B), and semantic values of the conditional
event (B|A) and biconditional event (B|A) ∧ (A|B), where 1 denotes
“true,” 0 denotes “false,” and u denotes “undefined.”
A B A ⊃ B A ∧ B B|A (B|A) ∧ (A|B)
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 u 0
0 0 1 0 u u
task through joint frequencies about patterned cards (Evans et al.,
2003; Oberauer and Wilhelm, 2003) and when dependencies are
derived from causal beliefs (Over et al., 2007). These interpreta-
tions also extend to conditional bets such as “I bet you 1 Euro that
if the chip is square then it is black” (Politzer et al., 2010), a result
which is predicted by foundational work on subjective probability
by Bruno de Finetti (Milne, 1997, gives an overview).
The conditional event, B|A, is often defined only for condi-
tional probabilities in terms of the ratio formula,
P(B|A) = P(A ∧ B)
P(A)
under the condition that P(A) > 0. Coherence-based probability
logic (CPL), proposed as a competence model for how peo-
ple reason (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2009), makes this a primitive,
B|A, which is “undefined,” “void,” or “undetermined” when the
antecedent is false, matching how participants often interpret
the conditional when reasoning under certainty (Johnson-Laird
and Tagart, 1969). Although this interpretation is often called
the “defective” conditional, there is a long history of justification
suggesting that there is nothing defective about it. CPL derives
a semantics for conditional probabilities, providing a bridge
between certainty and uncertainty. This explains why people who
use a “defective” conditional when reasoning about certainty also
reason using conditional probabilities for uncertain condition-
als (Evans et al., 2007, show this empirical link): it’s the same
underlying conditional.
Hailperin (1996) provides a further analysis of this conditional
event (he calls it the “suppositional”) in terms of a more primitive
operator in an extension of classical propositional logic, “don’t
care” logic.We present this in a some detail here as it shows clearly
the relationship with classical logic. Let 1 denote “true,” 0 denote
“false,” and u denote “undefined.” The ordering on these semantic
values is 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. This leads to natural min and max functions
for deciding the minimum and maximum of two values which
are used to define conjunction and disjunction, respectively. Let
min(x, y) = z; then z is either the x or y and chosen such that
z ≤ x and z ≤ y, i.e., the value is less than or equal to both x and y
according to the ordering above. Letmax(x, y) = z; then again z is
one of the x or y and z ≥ x and z ≥ y, i.e., the value is greater than
or equal to both x and y. Some examples to illustrate:max(0, 1) =
1 andmin(0, 1) = 0. If x and y are the same value then the answer
is that value for both min and max. When the u value is included
thenmax(0, u) = u (since u is greater than or equal to both 0 and
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itself) and min(0, u) = 0 (since 0 is less than or equal to both u
and itself). Finally 1 − u = u (this is used for defining negation).
U is a semantic function from formulas to semantic values, i.e.,
one of 0, 1, or u, as follows:
U(¬A) = 1 − U(A)
U(A ∧ B) = min(U(A),U(B))
U(A ∨ B) = max(U(A),U(B))
If we use only 1s and 0s, this is also the semantics of classical
propositional logic. When u is included, then the semantics is
equivalent to Kleene’s strong 3-valued logic (Kleene, 1952) which
turns out to be useful for the semantics for logic programming
(Fitting, 1985). Hailperin (1996) introduces an additional “don’t
care” unary connective, , with a semantic value defined:
U(A) =
{
0, if U(A) = 0
u, otherwise
If A is true then A evaluates to u; otherwise it has the same
semantic value as A. This allows B|A to be defined ¬A ∨
(A ∧ B), giving the same semantic values as CPL. Note the simi-
larity with the disjunctive expression of the material conditional,
¬A ∨ B, which is equivalent to ¬A ∨ (A ∧ B). Both have the
same semantic value when the antecedent is true, equivalent to
a conjunction. The disjunct highlights the difference when the
antecedent is false: for the conditional event the conditional is
undefined but for the material conditional it is true. (This is one
of many non-classical truth semantics; Baratgin et al. (2013) pro-
vide other interesting examples of further logical components
which are useful for psychological theorizing.) Individuals and
quantifiers are missing from this semantics, which limits its abil-
ity to model discourse; for instance it is not clear how to model
an interpretation of “most logicians who develop a logic love it.”
Returning to the psychology, there are interesting twists to
the new paradigm story. It turns out that the experimental data
also require us to model a defective biconditional, what Fugard
et al. (2011b) named the biconditional event. This is expressed as
(B|A) ∧ (A|B) (see Table 1 for its semantics values) and is equiv-
alent to A ∧ B|A ∨ B. Developmental studies show that 12 year
olds respond mostly with conjunctions, then by age 16 bicondi-
tional event interpretations appear before disappearing again in
adults (Gauffroy and Barrouillet, 2009). In adults, it is well repli-
cated that nearly half of participants interpret the conditional as a
conjunction, A ∧ B. Shifts of interpretation have also been found
within adults: many participants who begin with a conjunction
interpretation change that interpretation (without feedback) to
a conditional probability (Fugard et al., 2011b; Pfeifer, 2013).
Participants occasionally are explicit about this, describing their
reasoning about what they think they are supposed to do and
changing their goals, occasionally swearing as they do so, a sure
sign of norms awry.
Gauffroy and Barrouillet (2009) explain the developmental
trend in a revision of mental models theory. Essentially the idea
is that more slots of memory are required as one moves from
conjunction—produced by heuristic processes immune to strong
developmental changes’ (p. 274)—through biconditional event,
to conditional event. All reasoners are assumed to have the same
reasoning goals, they just fail if they have insufficient memory.
Fugard et al. (2011b) instead argued that there are twomain stages
to reasoning about these sorts of conditionals when the depen-
dencies are expressed in the stimulus, for instance as colored
cards. First one has to visually perceive the dependencies, which
requires attending to all cases. If you are reasoning about new evi-
dence then you first have to examine the evidence. All evidence is
initially relevant, even those cases where the antecedent is false, as
you can only tell it is false once you have seen it. The developmen-
tal trend can be seen as strategic ignorance when all the evidence
has been examined: first from no narrowing of hypothetical scope
for conjunctions (A ∧ B), to focusing on only those cases where
either antecedent or consequent are true (A ∧ B|A ∨ B), finally to
only those cases where the consequent is true, (A ∧ B|A) which
is equivalent to the conditional event B|A. Further support for
this model is that conjunctions seem to disappear in Experiment
1 by Over et al. (2007) where instead of reading dependencies
from the stimulus, they were taken from beliefs, e.g., that “If
nurses” salaries are improved then the recruitment of nurses will
increase. There is no need to consider evidence when you are
asked your opinion. This hypothetical narrowing could be for
many reasons. Perhaps there are variations in pragmatic language
function which affect the interpretation of what the experimenter
wants. Another explanation is that working memory and reason-
ing processes have competing goals: represent everything that one
sees versus reason about top-down goals concerning the present
task (Gray et al., 2003). The two could well be related and influ-
ence reasoning about goals. People can switch goals for resource
reasons.
The “new paradigm” is often presented as providing the
semantics for the conditional as illustrated by ‘the Equation’: P(‘if
A, then B’) = P(B|A). But interpretation is required for probabil-
ities too. Fugard et al. (2011a) showed that a relevance pragmatic
language effect, well replicated for non-probability problems in
the classical logic paradigm, also affects probabilistic theories of
conditionals. Consider the following sentence about a card.
If the card shows a 2, then the card shows a 2 or a 4.
In the old binary paradigm, people tend to think this sentence
is false (though with the usual individual differences) since the
possibility that the card could be a 4 seems irrelevant if you know
it is a 2. Fugard et al. (2011a) found that when participants were
shown four cards, numbered 1 to 4, and told that one has been
chosen at random, many thought the probability of this sentence
is 0. Probability logic (with the simple substitution interpretation)
predicts that they would say the probability is 1. Given the same
cards but instead the sentence
If the card shows a 2, then the card shows an even number,
most participants give the probability 1 which is now consistent
with the Equation. The new paradigm of transforming ‘if ’s into
conditional events does not predict this different in interpreta-
tion. Here, as for much of the psychology of reasoning, there are
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differences between participants in interpretation and not all rea-
soners have the goal to take relevance into consideration. Fugard
et al. (2011a) found no association between irrelevance aversion
and tendency to reason to a conjunction probability, suggesting
that the two processes are logically and psychologically distinct.
The problem for the probability story, as the semantics above
shows, is that the disjunction in probability logic is the same as
the disjunction in classical logic, so this provides a clue for a
solution. Schurz (1991) provided an extension of classical logic
for interpretations like these: sentence ϕ is a relevant conclusion
from premises  if (a) it follows according to classical logic, i.e.,
 	 ϕ holds, and (b) it is possible to replace any of the predicates
in ϕ with another such that ϕ no longer follows. Otherwise ϕ is
an irrelevant conclusion. Take for instance the inference x = 2 	
x = 2 ∨ x = 4. Since x = 4 can be replaced with any other pred-
icate (e.g., for the synesthetes red(x)) without affecting validity,
the conclusion is irrelevant. However for the inference x = 2 	
even(x), not all replacements preserve validity, for instance odd(x)
would not, so the conclusion is relevant. Fugard et al. (2011a)
propose adding this to the probability semantics.
Reasoners still have goals when they are reasoning about
uncertain information. There are competing processes related to
working memory and planning, which could explain develop-
mental processes and shifts of interpretation within participants.
Goals related to pragmatic language, such as relevance, are also
involved in uncertain reasoning. The investigations above high-
light the importance of a rich lattice of related logical frameworks.
The problems of classical logic have not gone away since, as
we have shown, much of classical logic remains in the 3-valued
semantics. Rather than only examining whether or not support
is found for the probability thesis, instead different norms are
needed through which to view the data and explain individual
differences. These norms need to bridge back to the overarching
goals reasoners have.
We finish this section with a comment on the treatment of
this same problem by Bayesian modeling. The probability heuris-
tic model (PHM) of Chater and Oaksford (1999) was one of
the first to protest against the idea that classical logic provided
the only interpretation of syllogistic performance. A protest with
which we evidently agree. This Bayesian model certainly changes
the measures of participants accuracy in the task. For the present
argument, two observations are relevant. Firstly, PHM is probably
best interpreted as a probability-based heuristic theorem prover
for classical logic. The underlying logic is still in classical logic and
even includes first-order logic statements. The truth of the propo-
sitions is assessed classically. This means that despite the rejection
of the formal model of classical logic, it has not departed very far.
PHM does not propose an alternative interpretation of the goal
of reasoning as we do here. Secondly, once the Bayesian model is
in place, the psychology stops. There is no motivation for seeking
other models of other qualitatively different kinds of reasoning,
because probability based models are supposed to account for all
reasoning. This may be a consequence of at least a whiff of poor
prescriptivism here, and bears out the claim we made that this
problem is found wherever one framework is seen as sufficient.
In contrast, in a multiple-logics approach, contrast between log-
ics is a rich source of insight and guidance as to how to find
the relevant psychological evidence. It should be evident from
this example that logic can make empirical experimental analy-
sis much richer. Instead of hundreds of experiments on essen-
tially the same design, one gets a vista of empirical questions to
explore.
5. CONCLUSIONS
A variety of formal systems, with their different constitu-
tive norms, and their different consequences for the regulative
norms of their users, will be required for modeling the differ-
ent goals of human reasoning. The main goal of the experimental
program of psychology of reasoning and decision at this point
should be to find contexts in which participants will exhibit their
maximum grasp of each system. Exploration can then spread out
to investigate how the logics work together inmore complex tasks;
how participants can generalist from these focal points; and how
teaching affects what they can do. If we win our bet on Harry
as a good teacher of an explicit grasp of the logical differences
between disputes and stories, and we can show the rudiments of
classical logic in a good proportion of participants’ performances,
then that does not mean that CL “won” over nonmonotonic log-
ics such as LP, or over probability logics, or whatever other logics
can be shown to have their contexts. It means we know a lit-
tle more about where to look for classical logic’s psychological
roots. We can ask how do these cognitive foundations develop,
and what individual and social experiences affect them. We can
ask how people at different stages of development and education
experience the phenomenology of their reasoning. We can ask
how best to achieve educational goals of making explicit students’
knowledge of logics. And so on.
In many cases, the empirical discriminations between logics
are surprisingly hard. Natural languages often do not provide ade-
quate (or indeed any) cues to intended reasoning goals. People are
good at recognizing the goals in customary rich social contexts
(few mistake a dispute for a story), but the lab removes all these
cues, as do many real-world professional contexts. Much effort is
currently going onto the issue of what probability theory is good
for, but little into where nonmonotonic logics are to be preferred.
Deep knowledge of the logical and computational properties of
these systems is available outside psychology but often shunned.
Formal systems such as logics and probability are still conven-
tionally seen as competing with psychology for explanations of
reasoning. A recent prominent example of this attitude (here to
probability rather than logic) is Jones and Love (2011).
Bayesian modeling of cognition has undergone a recent rise in
prominence, due largely to mathematical advances in specify-
ing and deriving predictions from complex probabilistic models.
Much of this research aims to demonstrate that cognitive behavior
can be explained from rational principles alone, without recourse
to psychological or neurological processes and representations.
Bayesians would dispute whether they claim to explain in ratio-
nal terms alone. We would disagree with many of their “rational
explanations.” One might certainly feel disappointed if rational
explanations were all of psychology. One of the reasons for our
detailed examples is to show that logical bases for explanations
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do not mean they cannot reveal psychological processes. A huge
amount of research in a descriptivist style has failed to make the
most important empirical distinctions about which interpreta-
tions of the tasks are adopted. But having said all this, to challenge
the idea that rational explanations are part of psychology is truly
extraordinary. What is needed is more attention to norms, and to
the way the constitutive norms of formal systems give rise to reg-
ulative norms for their use, and above all, on participants’ access
to these norms of both kinds.
There is no alternative to a psychology of reasoning which has
a rich theoretical vocabulary of reasoning norms, which consti-
tute different goals, and a fine nose for finding the contexts of
reasoning that call for the goals, based on the norms of the logical
models. Descriptivism never worked in any science.
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